AUSN

SUMMER 2018

Navy magazine is distributed on Capitol Hill,the Pentagon and naval bases around the world. It provides information that impacts Sailors, their families and the Navy. Navy is published quarterly by the Association of the United States Navy (AUSN).

Issue link: http://digital.ausn.org/i/1012109

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22 Navy | Summer 2018 disrupting our maintenance schedule — not to mention our training." Harrison realizes that taking such an approach would run counterintuitive to the service's culture and ethos. e alternative, he thinks, is trying to do too much with a force that is too small. "What I could see happening is the Navy scaling back some of its presence operations — in places like Japan, India and the Persian Gulf. Instead of having two ships there doing something, have one ship for a while. Or start taking gaps. It's not all-or-nothing. It would be scaling back," Harrison said. Largely, the missions Harrison is talking about would involve presence. Cutting down on the number of those missions could be done without undermining U.S. national security, he contends. "To do that, you'd need to have a conversation with our allies and partners," Harrison said. "You'd have to say, 'OK, the reason we're not going to do as much as we used to is because we could be more effective and ready if we can get those forces back home and through the maintenance cycle properly.'" Allies would have to be assured that the change would not entail a complete pullout, and that ships would be there when they are needed. e Navy considers maintenance as one important component of a multi-pronged endeavor to learn from the mistakes of last year, as well as those of the past couple of decades. CDR Paul Reinhardt was in charge of coordinating the various working groups within the Readiness Reform Steering Group, which had an active role in the process. In total, Reinhardt told Navy magazine, two of the internal panels — the Strategic Readiness Review and the Comprehensive Review of Surface Force Incidents — collectively produced well over 100 recommendations. "Aer those reviews were complete, the vice CNO [Vice Chief of Naval Operations ADM Bill Moran] established the Readiness Reform Oversight Council — a four-star-level body — charged to oversee not only the recommendations from [both the strategic and comprehensive reviews], but other related government reports — by the IG [Inspector General] and the GAO [Government Accountability Office] — related to readi- ness," Reinhardt said. Other key players — assigned to the fleet and with the Naval Surface Force Pacific — also were included. Congress and Pentagon leadership, too, had to be kept apprised of any progress. Reinhardt said that roughly 75 percent of the recommended changes had been implemented as of Oct. 1, the beginning of the federal government's 2018 fiscal year. Issues included: ❑ Command and control. Reinhardt said that a surface group WESTPAC (Western Pacific) was established in Japan, with the responsibility for maintenance and training of the destroyers based there. Another would be established for the 2nd Fleet Commander at Norfolk Naval Station, Va. (See related story on page 24.) ❑ Operations. "We're looking at making sure we give ships dedicated training periods," Reinhardt said. "[In] some of the factors at the collisions, training periods were not being protected. ey were being circumvented and waived, [in order] to do high- er-priority missions." ❑ Manning and training. Reinhardt said they conducted a "full, comprehensive review — for not only officers, but Sailors too." ey studied "every- thing from manning Japan to what the career path for a surface-warfare officer would look like as the Navy moves forward." ❑ Fiscal issues. ey sought to "identify some of the weaknesses and challenges we discovered — fiscal barriers — and attack those, to provide adequate funding," Reinhardt said. ese issues have a serious effect at the deck-plate level, he said. In the McCain incident, for example, the ship had a steering system that looked very different from others within the vessels of the same class. Funding must be available to train sailors and officers to use each different system, he said. Similarly, other problems arose with divergent radar systems. If these systems cannot be standardized, at the very least their operators have to know how to use each. ❑ Best industry practices. e Navy wants to know if industry can offer advice that would lead to the discovery of errors at a lower level, before something as serious as a ship collision with loss of life occurs. ❑ Governance. e Navy wants to do anything it can to affect necessary legislative changes. is could include identifying any changes that should be made to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the 1986 law that streamlined the Defense Department chain of command.

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