AUSN

WINTER 2018

Navy magazine is distributed on Capitol Hill,the Pentagon and naval bases around the world. It provides information that impacts Sailors, their families and the Navy. Navy is published quarterly by the Association of the United States Navy (AUSN).

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90-day look at the Navy's overall past performance, with specific focus on the stresses on the force and the overall culture of operational risk manage- ment, training and organization. e team included service and industry experts who had experience with inves- tigations of major inci- dents in other contexts, in order to leverage their knowledge of best practices from previous lessons-learned efforts," said Spencer. "e Strategic Readiness Review team's assessment determined that today's readiness deficiencies are not traceable to any single policy or leadership decision, but rather the cumula- tive effect of well-meaning decisions that were designed to achieve short-term operational goals," he said. "ose decisions unfortunately produced unintended, and unacceptable, nega- tive consequences which degraded long-term operational capabilities." "In each case, Bridge and CIC [Combat Information Center] watchstanders did not maintain situational awareness and recognize that a significant error chain was in motion. Once confronted with an extreme situation, watchstander actions failed to comply with procedures as outlined in governing directives, as well as common customs of service, such as standard commands," the CR concluded. "Addi- tionally, watchstanders did not take emergency actions, to include sounding alarms, signaling to the other ship, or warning the crew. In every mishap, departures from procedures or approved customary practices were deemed to have directly contributed to the mishap." Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran is co-chair of the oversight board respon- sible for implementing recommendations from the SRR and CR. In a Navy blog post, Moran said the board is organized to trace what has already been done to ensure near-term safe and effective operations at sea and to the longer- term institutional measures necessary for lasting improvement in today's Surface Force. Some elements of this process have begun, Moran said. "Specific recommendations from the two reviews last fall are already under way. Examples include ensuring that no Forward Deployed Naval Force Japan ships are operating without certification for their assigned missions; completing an evaluation of naval requirements in the Western Pacific to prioritize operations in theater; and establishing a comprehensive fatigue and endurance management policy to guide command teams to make balanced risk decisions. "e scope of the tragedies and the obliga- tion we all have to our lost shipmates demands our full attention as senior leaders in order for the fleet to maintain its warfighting edge," Moran said. Changes in Training One of the key recommendations of the CR was to institute better training combined with a more rigorous assessment process, to make sure the training was effective and the individual, the watchstanders and teams are qualified. at training starts at Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS). "We here at SWOS own part of that respon- sibility, and we take our sense of account- ability very seriously," CAPT Scott Robertson, commanding officer of SWOS, told Navy magazine. "We must instill the competence 27 Association of the United States Navy

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